Am. Nat\u27l Fire Ins. Co. v. Yellow Freight Systems, lnc. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 325 F. 3d 924 (Decided April 10, 2003) by Nicole Oversier \u2706
Admiralty Practicum 
Volume 2003 
Issue 2 Fall 2003 Article 5 
February 2018 
Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Yellow Freight Systems, lnc. United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 325 F. 3d 924 (Decided 
April 10, 2003) 
Nicole Oversier '06 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum 
 Part of the Admiralty Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nicole Oversier '06 (2003) "Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Yellow Freight Systems, lnc. United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 325 F. 3d 924 (Decided April 10, 2003)," Admiralty Practicum: Vol. 2003 : 
Iss. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/admiralty_practicum/vol2003/iss2/5 
This Recent Admiralty Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Admiralty Practicum by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
boats for purely recreational purposes is insufficient to demonstrate that the pond has a 
capacity or suitability for commercial transportation." Jd. at 84. 
The court held that Mohawk Club failed to present a prima facie case because it 
was unable to demonstrate that Lake Mariaville had any historic use of commercial 
transportation and the lake lacked suitable public access. The Appellate Division, Third 
Department affirmed the lower court's denial of plaintiffs motion. 
Ian O'Malley 
Class of 2005 
APPLICATION OF TH E CARMACK AMENDMEN T, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14706, TO 
LAND CARRIERS 
A shipper establishes aprimafacie case when it shows: (1) delivery in good 
condition, (2) arrival in damaged condition, and (3 ) the amount of damages. Upon 
such a showing, the burden shifts to the carrier to show both that it was free from 
negligence and that the damages to the cargo were due to one of the excepted causes 
relieving the carrier of liability: (1) acts of God, (2) acts of the public enemy, (3 ) acts 
of the shipper himself, (4) public authority, or (5) the inherent vice or nature of the 
goods. Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C.S § 14706. 
Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Yellow Freight Systems, lnc. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
325 F. 3d 924 
(Decided April 10, 2003) 
Plaintiff, American National Fire Insurance Company (" American National"), 
subrogee of a cigar manufacturer alleged that a shipment of cigars transported by the 
defendant, Yellow Freight Systems ("Yellow Freight"), was damaged in transit due to 
water leakage in the freight carrier's trailer. Plaintiff brought suit in United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, claiming damages 
under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14706. The district court ruled that the 
plaintiff-subrogee had established a prima facie case under the Carn1ack Amendment. In 
addition the district court held that the defendant failed to prove that it was free from 
negligence and that the damage to the cargo was due to one of the excepted causes 
relieving it from liability. The district court awarded the plaintiff the costs of freight, 
taxes, and insurance. 
The defendant appeals the district court's nding that the plaintiff proved a prima 
facie case under the Carmack Amendment, that the defendant did not prove any of the 
excepted causes, and that the damaged cartons were part of the shipment at issue. In 
addition, the defendant appeals the district court's award of freight, taxes, and insurance. 
The p lai nti ff cross-appeals the district court's decision that the elate of subrogation, rather 
than the elate of delivery of the damaged goods, should be used to determine the date of 
accrual for prejudgment interest. In addition, the plaintiff argues that the district court 
erred in awarding simple rather than compound interest. The United States Court of 
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit partially affirmed the district court's ruling, but reduced 
the award to reflect a determination that only a percentage of the cargo was damaged. 
The issue of whether to award prejudgment interest rather than compound interest was 
remanded back to the district court for further examination. 
In making this determination, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court was 
correct in determining that the plaintiff proved that the cargo was in good condition upon 
delivery to the defendant and was damaged upon arrival to its destination, therefore 
establishing a prima facie case against the defendant. In addition, the court determined 
that the defendant failed to prove it was free from negligence and that the damage to the 
cargo was due to one of the excepted causes relieving it from l iability. Testimony of the 
defendant's freight's driver stated that upon delivery to the defendant, some of the 
cardboard box tops were "crunched," but there was no indication that the cartons were 
wet or sufficiently damaged. Yet at the time of arrival, testimony showed that the cartons 
were wet, some of the bottoms were disintegrated, and many boxes were crushed. The 
court affirmed the district court's ruling that the defendants failed to prove that the 
damage was caused by the shipper's improper packaging. The defendant argued that the 
damage was caused by the plaintiffs use of cardboard boxes rather than crates in 
packaging. The court affirmed the lower court's finding that the shipper had received 
millions of cigars packed in used cardboard boxes that arrived undamaged. 
With regards to the defendant's complaint that a comparison of the inventory of 
the plaintiffs adjuster, the original packing lists shows that 45 of 59 damaged cartons 
were not a part of the 118 cartons at issue. The defendant claims that the original packing 
list noted two types of cigars and two lengths, while the plaintiffs adjuster showed 
multiple types and lengths of cigars. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, despite the 
argued discrepancies, the defendant neglected to submit evidence to prove this allegation. 
However, with respect to the defendant's argument that the district court erred in 
award ing the plaintiff recovery for taxes, fees, freight charges, and insurance for the 
entire shipment, the court noted that under the Carmack Amendment shippers can 
"recover for actual losses to their property caused by the carrier." Under Carmack, the 
ordinary measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the property 
had it arrived undamaged and the market value in the condition in which it did arrive. 
Under this measurement, the shipper i s  not entitled to recover freight costs because that 
cost is figured into the market price. The lower court did not follow the ordinary market 
cost measurement of damages and instead awarded plaintiff damages based on the cost to 
the shipper of the cigars damaged. The lower court also awarded plaintiff taxes, broker's 
fees, freight and insurance paid for the entire cigar shipment. The Seventh Circuit 
reversed holding that plaintiff should be awarded freight, taxes, insurance, and fees for 
only fifty-five percent of the shipment was not destroyed. If awarded the cost for the 
undamaged cigars, the court stated that the plaintiff would be recovering twice. 
The court affirmed the district court's award of prejudgment interest accruing 
from the date that the plaintiff-subrogee paid the shipper. In affirming the district court's 
opinion, the Court noted that the plaintiff was only entitled to recover the money it had 
actually paid to the shipper; which was the interest from the point it actually paid the 
shipper, not from the date that the carrier delivered the damaged cargo to its destination. 
Finally, the court questioned the district court's decision to change its award from 
compound to simple interest. While the court did not specifically condemn this decision, 
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it remanded the issue back to the district court for an explanation of the lower court's  
rationale. 
Nicole Oversier 
Class of 2006 
THE PROPRIETY OF AN ADMIN ISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CONSIDERING 
AN INDIVIDUAL'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF A D ISABILITY 
CLAIM 
A claim of mistake in a motion to modify disability benefits based on medical 
reports created after the initial decision is a factual, rather than legal issue. Thus it 
is proper for an Administrative Law J udge to consider the motion. 
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Campbell 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
59 Fed. Appx. 568 
(Decided March II, 2003) 
In I987, appellee Terry Campbell injured his head, neck, and back while working 
for appellant Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation ("Norshipco"). After the 
incident, Campbell continued to work for Norshipco from May I987 to January I993 
receiving differing amounts of disability compensation. In response, Campbell filed a 
claim for temporary total disability under the Longshore and Harbor Worker's 
Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). After reviewing Campbell's claim, the Administrative 
Law Judge ("ALJ") concluded that: (I) Campbell was not fired in retaliation for filing a 
disability claim, (2) suitable alternate employment existed despite Campbell's limitations, 
and (3) Campbell was fired from the suitable alternate employment for willful 
misconduct. Accordingly, the ALJ rejected Campbell's claim for temporary total 
disability. 
Campbell filed a request for modification pursuant to Section 22 of the LHWCA, 
which allows a compensation decision to be modified based on a change of condition or a 
mistake of fact. Campbell alleged a change in condition and a mistake of fact with regard 
to his ability to perform the light duty employment offered by Norshipco. After a second 
hearing, the ALJ concluded that there had been no change in condition nor had there been 
a mistake of fact. Campbell appealed this decision to the Department of Labor's Benefits 
Review Board ("BRB"). The BRB affirmed the AU's decision that there had been no 
change in condition, but remanded for further consideration on the issue of whether there 
had been a mistake of fact regarding the alternate employment offered to Campbell. On 
remand, the ALJ concluded that the alternate work offered by Norshipco was outside 
Campbell's abilities and awarded him permanent partial disability benefits. After 
subsequent appeals by Norshipco to the BRB, the ALJ issued a final order awarding 
limited benefits to Campbell. After the BRB affirmed this decision, Norshipco appealed 
to the Fourth Circuit. 
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